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This paper explores the demise of progressive music education in America during the 1940s and 
1950s, when philosopher John Dewey and other social progressives were being blamed by 
conservatives for a lack of educational standards that purportedly hampered the country’s 
ability to fight the Cold War. Whereas Dewey had argued that the central purpose of education 
should be the creation of a politically informed and engaged citizenry as a check to government 
and corporate power and control, and that art education could be an important tool in that 
political project, conservatives contended that education needed to be harnessed in defense of 
democratic capitalism. The new educational emphasis was to be on the promotion of disciplinary 
knowledge, abstract thinking ability, and educational specialization—all of which were deemed 
useful to the Cold War effort—and not the fostering of democratic citizenship. Education was 
reconceived as a form “of social control rather than liberation” (Crist, 2003, p. 458). The story 
of the death of Dewey’s educational philosophy is told through the writings of progressive music 
educator James Mursell, government education spokesperson Jerome Bruner, and prominent 
individuals involved in the shaping of the early aesthetic education movement that arose in 
response to the new educational regime. The paper concludes with a review and discussion of 
Dewey’s philosophy to explain how those and subsequent educational reforms during the past 
half century have contributed to the political disfranchisement of children by keeping them in 
ignorance of real-world problems affecting them and society. 
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One hears much nowadays about the Occupy Wall Street movement with its popular 
slogan “we are the 99%” that is challenging corporate greed and control over the western 
democracies. Their basic complaint is that the gap between the rich and poor has been increasing 
and that our respective countries are controlled by a tiny fraction of the population that owns 
most of the wealth but that remains unaccountable for its actions. In the years leading up to 2008, 
for example, corporate executives in the United States successfully lobbied politicians to 
deregulate markets, and this, coupled with low interest rates, contributed to a market meltdown 
and corporate bankruptcy on a scale not seen since the Great Depression. The subsequent Great 
Recession of 2008 made it necessary for governments to prop up big banks and major businesses 
with massive injections of public money (Stiglitz, 2010). Capitalism, to paraphrase philosopher 
John Dewey (1859-1952), had to be rescued from itself. Nevertheless, and while the 
aforementioned Recession was largely caused by corporate greed, the resulting economic 
reforms primarily benefitted the rich at the expense of the middle class and poor (Albritton, 
2009). 
Most music teachers, though, probably consider the Occupy Wall Street movement a 
fringe group that has nothing to do with them or education and that it should be ignored or, at 
best, tolerated in the name of free speech. They would be surprised to learn that Dewey, one of 
the founders of the progressive education movement, blamed capitalism for art’s segregation 
from the everyday experience of the masses, which he contended only contributed to their 
political emasculation. Yet, while American and Canadian music educators have long 
acknowledged their own indebtedness to Dewey’s philosophy, they have generally ignored his 
politics (e.g., Meyer, 1956; Leonhard & House, 1959/1972; Schwadron, 1967; Reimer, 1959, 
1970, 1989; Woodford, 1994; Elliott, 1995). 
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This paper explores some of the history of music teachers’ avoidance of Dewey’s politics 
with reference to events leading to the demise of progressive education during the early Cold 
War. Between 1945 and 1960, progressive music education was supplanted by aesthetic music 
education, even as proponents of the latter philosophy continued to be drawn to Dewey’s ideas 
about aesthetic experience. As readers will learn, among the factors that explain this 
inconsistency between Dewey’s politics and music education philosophy and practice during 
those years were: 1) a propensity for musical and educational escapism among progressive music 
educators during the Great Depression and World War Two; 2) the rejection of Dewey’s notion 
of participatory democracy by conservatives in the late 1940s and 1950s; 3) a corresponding 
reconceptualization of education as social control during the 1950s and early 1960s that worked 
to divert teachers’ and students’ attention away from social problems; and 4) Dewey’s own 
occasional “pretense of neutrality” that may have misled the less informed into believing that his 
educational philosophy had more in common with the aesthetic education movement than was 
actually the case (Rorty, 1989, p. xi). 
One reason why music teachers continued to be drawn to certain aspects of Dewey’s 
philosophy after World War Two was that he had long championed music and the arts in 
education and was widely regarded as the unofficial national philosopher, “the guide, the mentor, 
and the conscience of the American people” (Commager as cited in Westbrook, 1991, p. xiv). On 
first consideration, it is thus tempting to interpret music educators’ continued reliance on Dewey 
during the early Cold War as an act of professional loyalty, courage, and political resistance at a 
time when he was being blamed for all of the country’s ills by conservatives wishing to push the 
country further to the political right. As readers will see, the uncomfortable truth of the matter is 
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that music teacher leaders bastardized his philosophy by deliberately ignoring or stripping away 
much of its political content, thereby rendering it politically correct and safe. 
Those leading the early aesthetic education movement in music during the 1950s must 
surely have known that they were doing violence to Dewey’s philosophy, even as they continued 
to cite him. Education philosopher Foster McMurray contributed a chapter on pragmatism to the 
landmark 1958 National Society for the Study of Education (NSSE) Yearbook, Basic Concepts 
in Music Education, that was in several respects consistent with Dewey’s philosophy and critical 
of contemporary practice. Progressive music educator James Mursell (1893-1963), in his role as 
psychologist, also contributed a chapter on musical growth that was somewhat indebted to 
Dewey, although neither he nor his politics were mentioned. Among contributors to the book 
who were influential in the early aesthetic education movement were philosopher Harry Broudy 
and music educators Allen Britton, Robert House, and Charles Leonhard. 
The latter two men had nothing to say about philosophy or Dewey in their own chapters, 
the topics of which—curriculum construction and evaluation in music education—were purely 
technical. But in their influential 1959 book Foundations and Principles of Music Education they 
drew on Dewey’s conception of aesthetic experience to develop a vision for music education 
while deliberately rejecting his politics. Music education, they declared, had nothing to do with a 
democratic way life, except very indirectly, while musical groups were about “the most 
authoritarian groups in which one ever finds himself” (Leonhard & House, 1959/1972, p. 112). 
As described in Foundations and Principles of Music Education, their vision of music education 
was consistent with Broudy’s Platonic realist conception of music education as connoisseurship 
in which children learned how to think like musical experts. According to this model, which is 
described later and contrasted with McMurray’s pragmatism, teaching for political awareness or 
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other “extrinsic values” only led to “musical delinquency” (Leonhard & House, 1959/1972, p. 
75). 
Mursell’s “Apostle of Beauty” 
This was a decidedly un-Deweyan social and educational agenda not only because it 
favored social and cultural elites but also because, to paraphrase Mursell (1950) in his earlier role 
as social philosopher, it led to the creation of only a handful of expert and oft-times self-centered 
musicians, rather than to the development of legions of interested and informed amateur 
musicians imbued with the democratic spirit. The music program, he advised, “should stand, 
above everything else, for a free, happy, humane association of people, young and old, who 
rejoice in one another’s successes, who bear with and seek to relieve one another’s weaknesses, 
and whose experience in working together with the art is transposed into an association for 
which the only adequate name is friendship” (Mursell, 1943b, p. 11). There was a need and role 
for expert musicians in all this, but “expertness is abortive” unless it contributes to the pursuit of 
that democratic ideal (Mursell, 1950, p. 22). 
Mursell (1951) also warned that the pursuit of high levels of musical expertise implied 
increasing specialization, which would only relegate music to the periphery of the school “and 
more and more overshadowed by competing interests” (p. 24). Music should instead be “a vital 
and integral factor in general education,” he said, and “we must get out of our heads every 
vestige of the notion that we are trying to train low-grade professional musicians, and get into 
our heads the notion of promoting awareness of, and interest in, music on the largest possible 
scale” (p. 24). Music should be at the core of the curriculum of both school and university, while 
the role of the teacher and college professor was to create a vital and inclusive musical life 
throughout the institution. A university faculty or department of music that did not go beyond 
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training expert musicians, musicologists, and music teachers to engage the wider community was 
“betraying its most essential trust” (Mursell, 1944, p. 50).  
“Catholicity of taste, sympathy, and understanding” (Mursell, 1934, p. 269) was the goal 
for music education, although Mursell was nonetheless clearly predisposed in favor of the 
classics. He sometimes appeared to contradict himself by claiming that the “true” or “ultimate 
aim of music education” was the development of high levels of expertise and musicality 
(Mursell, 1932, p. 11). Writing in the Music Supervisors Journal in 1932, for example, he argued 
that “if anyone wants to learn to write artistic and powerful English, he does so by writing 
numerous essays, stories, and so on, and above all by carrying each such undertaking to the 
highest attainable perfection” (p. 11). Elsewhere, however, he expressly warned against the 
pursuit of high levels of musical training as an end in itself because, while potentially “a most 
precious resource” for teachers, attempts to impose unrealistic vocal or technical demands on 
children, for example, would kill their natural impulse to sing (Mursell, 1950, p. 21). Rather, 
“our chief emphasis must be upon the emotional and expressive aspects of music” (Mursell, 
1934, p. 59). “Every musical undertaking must involve cooperative effort for the very best 
results” (p. 158), which implied high standards, but these were relative and not preconceived, 
fixed, or imposed from without by politicians or teachers. The ideal was that each child should 
voluntarily seek to “do as well as he is able” (p. 159), which was the real measure of educational 
success. 
Despite Mursell’s (1943b) earlier warnings about the dangers of expert music education 
models, narrow educational specialization, and the “Fascist-like routines of the professional 
symphony orchestra in our high school instrumental programs” (p. 10), music educators in the 
1950s were for political and other reasons more receptive to Broudy’s realism than they were to 
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McMurray’s pragmatism (Colwell, in press). Both of the latter two men’s chapters in Basic 
Concepts give the appearance of political neutrality, even though McMurray was actually calling 
for the development of critical awareness in children by revealing how their musical preferences 
and tastes were often delimited by socio-economic factors. McMurray (1958), however, 
contradicted himself and obscured whatever political or socio-economic meanings music 
education might have by insisting that music be taught purely for its “unique,” aesthetic qualities, 
which was something that Dewey would not have countenanced. 
Mursell (1958), in his own chapter in Basic Concepts, may also have inadvertently 
contributed to a tendency of political avoidance among music teachers by declaring that “the 
purpose of all music teaching must be to bring about the evolution of musical responsiveness . . . 
to the tonal and rhythmic patterns which are the substance of the art of music” (p. 146). This 
sounds very similar to Broudy’s (1958) connoisseurship, explained later, and also to Leonard 
Meyer’s (1956) description of musical experience as outlined in his book Emotion and Meaning 
in Music. Meyer too drew on Dewey’s philosophy to describe aesthetic experience but similarly 
bastardized it by treating it as isolated from politics and other forms of experience. Musical 
response was described as individualistic and not, as Dewey (1934) had conceived it, as 
occurring within the wider context of “collective civilization” (p. 346). Meyer’s book, and also 
the aforementioned Foundations and Principles by Leonhard and House (1959/1972), 
subsequently proved seminal in the shaping of the newly emerging philosophy of music 
education as aesthetic education as eventually and best articulated by Bennett Reimer (1970). 
Earlier in his career, though, in his role as philosopher, Mursell (1934) wrote that “the 
thing always to remember is that music in a vacuum, music for itself alone, music as a show, 
loses enormously in artistic [and thus also human interest and] values. In proportion as it 
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becomes woven into” and enriches “daily living, it acquires new artistic significance” (pp. 18-
19). Writing during the middle of World War Two and speculating about the future of music 
education, he encouraged teachers to “emphasize its aesthetic values, its cultural values, its social 
values, its human values” (Mursell, 1943a, p. 15). Music was a tool for use in daily living and a 
potentially powerful means of communication, but it was clearly its spiritual and aesthetic 
content that mattered most to him. Further, and while insisting that music was a social art and 
thus susceptible to use or abuse, he consistently ignored or glossed over its potential for misuse. 
He was an incurable romantic and prone to uttering platitudes with respect to music’s potential 
for glorifying human life and for conveying “the essence of spiritual experience” (Mursell, 1941, 
p. 11). In an article published in The Music Educators Journal in 1941, for example, Mursell 
lauds music as “that wonderful creation of the human spirit” through which “man proclaims 
more intimately, more certainly, more triumphantly than in any other medium a certainty of the 
reality of good” (p. 10). Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony is said to be an expression of this 
“wordless creed in music” (p. 10), but Mursell seems oblivious to the fact that this same 
composition both before and during the war years had different meanings to the Germans, 
Soviets, and Americans and served opposing political agendas. 
Similar statements abound in Mursell’s many publications relating to music education. In 
the abovementioned article speculating about the future of music education in postwar America, 
for example, music is described as an “adornment, an enhancement, an agency for elevation and 
delight” (Mursell, 1943a, p. 15). In the end, and despite his own admonition in Basic Concepts 
against “loose talk about the ‘therapeutic’ effects of music” (Mursell, 1958, p. 152), his primary 
goal was the promotion of “emotional stability and permanent happiness” (Mursell, 1934, p. 36) 
through musical growth. His ideal music teacher was an “apostle of beauty” who imparted 
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timeless truths and values to children while also teaching them to make constructive use of 
leisure time (p. 11). As is explained later, Dewey would have rejected this model as escapist 
because it ignored music’s potential as social and political criticism. 
More consistent with Dewey’s philosophy was Mursell’s (1944) call for a renewal of 
faith in progressive education among music teachers to ensure that the nation’s schools were 
“attractive and available to all—to develop programs which are hospitable and inclusive rather 
than snobbish and exclusive” (p. 13). Convinced that the post-war government would want “to 
use the schools as a major instrumentality for reorienting the nation to the demands of peace” (p. 
12), and that government was currently undecided with respect to the direction of education 
reform, Mursell called for the development of a concerted policy and effort to secure the future 
of progressive music education. Later, music teachers were urged to abandon all preconceptions 
about music teaching and learning and to ask themselves: “What can music mean for the 
layman? [italics his]” (Mursell, 1951, p. 24). By then, though, it was too late to save progressive 
education, as Dewey and other social progressives were already being blamed by conservatives 
for all of the country’s ills, including a lack of educational standards that hampered the country’s 
efforts to fight the Cold War. Education was to be an instrumentality for war—not peace—and 
the emphasis was to be on the development of expert specialists and not on the creation of an 
informed and educated citizenry that could make constructive use of leisure time.  
One can only wonder how Mursell must have felt reading Thurber Madison’s (1958) 
introductory chapter of Basic Concepts referring to “public criticism of some of the extremes of 
progressive education” (p. 23) and to the growing interest in science, educational specialization, 
and gifted children. Music educators were also clearly expected to conform to this new model 
and understanding of the purpose of education. The book’s editor, Nelson Henry (1958), stated 
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that it was designed to promote “more effective orientation of instructional programs to accepted 
goals of formal education” (p. viii), while Madison (1958) described music teachers as 
“traditionally loyal to whatever seems to stand for the total philosophy of the schools” (p. 23). 
This was followed with an admonition that they develop a better understanding of the recent 
education reforms lest their effort to adapt them to music “come short of its intended mark” (p. 
24). 
It is also interesting to speculate about what Mursell would have said in response to his 
historiographer Vincent O’Keeffe’s (1970) claim that the progressive education movement was a 
victim of its own success—that by the late 1950s its ideas and precepts were by then 
“commonplace and accepted by a majority of educators” (pp. 254-255), and that the movement 
had therefore become obsolete. O’Keeffe also claimed that Mursell’s ideas were consistent with 
those of psychologist Jerome Bruner, who, during the late 1950s and early 1960s, was charged 
by government with spearheading the new education reforms. In his landmark books The 
Process of Education (1960) and On Knowing: Essays for the Left Hand (1962/1970), though, 
Bruner announced the death of Dewey’s educational philosophy! 
Nevertheless, there is some truth to the assertion that Mursell’s ideas, as articulated in 
Basic Concepts, were consistent with those of Bruner, since both men conceived of education in 
terms of the structure of knowledge and of the development of the requisite perceptual skills and 
abilities. They differed considerably in political outlook, however, with respect to which social 
values and ends were most worth pursuing, or at least that was the case earlier in Mursell’s 
career, when Dewey figured most prominently in his thinking. Mursell’s book, The Psychology 
of School Music Teaching (Mursell & Glenn, 1931), co-written with Mabelle Glenn, for 
example, concludes with a discussion of “music education as an agency for creative democracy” 
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(p. 375). Democracy is defined in Deweyan terms as being less about a political structure as a 
way of life characterized by “wide and intimate sharing of experience, a social situation where 
lives may meet and may mutually refresh, instruct, inspire, and encourage one another” (p. 375). 
Bruner (1962/1970), though, scoffed at this notion of justifying “subject matter . . . in terms of its 
relation to the child’s social activities” and accused Dewey of misunderstanding “what 
knowledge is and how it may be mastered” (p. 121). 
O’Keeffe (1970) would have readers believe that the progressive education movement 
died a natural death when it was a victim of events and politics as the country’s schools and 
universities were being “harnessed to the services of power” (Phenix, 1959, p. 270) to fight the 
Cold War. Following the 1958 National Defense Education Act, each school subject had to be 
reconceived as a discipline if it was to secure a place in the country’s schools, which meant that 
it had to be seen as politically neutral and as developing expertise and abstract thinking ability in 
children (Mark, 1999). The truth of the matter, of course, was that this conception of education 
was anything but politically neutral. Rather than preparing children to participate as democratic 
citizens and moral agents in the shaping of a more humane society, as Dewey and Mursell had 
long advocated, music education’s new political purpose became to “develop the useful powers 
of every individual” (Leonhard & House, 1959/1972, p. 75) so that America could better 
compete militarily, economically, and culturally with the Soviets and Europeans. Regrettably, by 
the time he was entering retirement in the late 1950s, Mursell appears to have had nothing to say 
about this or in defence of Dewey’s or his own politics. If his chapter in Basic Concepts is any 
indication, by 1958 he had finally conceded the defeat of progressive music education and had 
abandoned his former dual role as social philosopher and psychologist. His role was now that of 
developmental psychologist and purveyor of scientific truths. 
11
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Broudy’s Connoisseurship vs. McMurray’s Pragmatism 
Given the culture of fear and the consensus politics of the early Cold War, it was almost 
inevitable that music teachers reading Basic Concepts would have been more attracted to 
Broudy’s (1958) Platonic realism than to McMurray’s (1958) pragmatism. Broudy’s model was 
more consistent with the then prevailing democratic realist conception of government as rule by 
social elites and expert specialists. Music experts and connoisseurs, according to Broudy (1958), 
were “the only reliable source of standards” (p. 84) and thus the measure of educational success. 
This would have been anathema to Dewey, had he still been alive by then, as he was wary of 
experts, but also because realists contended that the masses were incapable of participating 
intelligently in public life, including art and music. Realists conceived of democracy and 
education as “means of social control rather than liberation” (Crist, 2003, p. 458), as the latter 
was thought to only lead to chaos and weakness. Bruner’s (1962/1970) book On Knowing, 
described in greater length at the conclusion of this paper, epitomized this conception of 
government and education as social control and involving the development of expert specialists. 
In this new political and world order, there was no room in education for “the child-centered and 
sometimes mawkish compassion of Dewey” (p. 163)! 
McMurray (1958) shared Dewey’s faith in the intelligence of the common man and 
woman, but he was not immune to the new educational rhetoric and agreed with Broudy that 
greater specialization was needed. McMurray (1958) may have even contributed to Broudy’s 
success by admonishing music teachers to keep their own counsel and not to seek inspiration and 
guidance from philosophers and psychologists, because they were currently “at theoretical odds” 
and would only frustrate the development of a “unified perspective” (p. 36). The latter’s disputes 
would only confuse matters by diverting music teachers’ attention away from their own 
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discipline and its problems. Experts and specialists from other disciplines were similarly to be 
avoided, owing to lack of musical and educational competence. This was clearly a strategy to 
secure a place for music education in the schools, but it was a hypocritical and possibly self-
serving statement for McMurray to make, considering he was a philosopher and not a music 
educator. However, it was politically correct for the times and, although probably unintentional, 
served the interests of those in power by discouraging the wider professional discussion and 
debate that music teachers needed to understand the new education reforms and their political 
implications. 
McMurray’s pragmatism also shared other features with Broudy’s realist agenda. 
Tellingly, a book reviewer at the time observed that, although they seemed to disagree, “they 
both arrive at the same ultimate goal: the appreciation of ‘good music’” (Spivacke, 1959, p. 250). 
Only serious music, that is, subtle and refined “music that possesses the strongest aesthetic 
content” (McMurray, 1991, p. 60), was educative. The difference between them was primarily in 
how teachers and their students were to arrive at that goal. Whereas Broudy (1958) preached 
reliance on musical experts who were to impose their standards, preferences, and tastes onto 
children until such time as they were ready to decide their “own tastes on the basis of experience 
and knowledge” (p. 85), McMurray (1958) argued that this was only possible if children were 
made aware of the often subtle social forces that shaped their musical tastes and understandings. 
The teacher’s job was to “show his pupils what is to be found in music when obstacles to 
perception are removed and when the learned capacity to attend and to hear has been developed” 
(p. 43). 
This was a political agenda for music education, albeit not expressly stated in those 
terms. A quarter of a century later, in Basic Concepts in Music Education II, McMurray (1991) 
13
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was far more explicit in blaming capitalism for an “oppressive and demeaning” (p. 61) prejudice 
embedded in mass culture that persuaded working and middle class children that serious music 
was only for the talented and for social and economic elites. According to the prevailing 
capitalist scheme, the middle class were more educable than the working class, but neither class 
of children was in need of “refined tastes in music and art” (p. 61). Broudy’s realist conception 
of music education as the pursuit of excellence only perpetuated the existing social hierarchy by 
teaching the masses of children to “accept their humble place[s]” (p. 65) as second or third class 
citizens. Excellence was by definition only attainable by the few. All of this, however, is veiled 
in McMurray’s (1958) chapter. Given the anti-Communist hysteria and witch-hunts of the 1950s, 
it could have been politically dangerous to criticize capitalism in those terms. 
Dewey: No “Beauty Parlor”  
Dewey (1934) also believed in cultivating the tastes of the masses, whom he regarded as 
innately intelligent but frustrated in their development by a capitalist system that created a 
“chasm between ordinary and esthetic experience” (p. 10) that stifled perception of aesthetic 
qualities implicit in everyday work and life. The resulting aesthetic deficit rendered work a 
drudgery for most. “Oligarchic control from the outside of the processes and the products of 
work,” he argued, “is the chief force in preventing the worker from having that intimate interest 
in what he does and makes that is an essential prerequisite of esthetic satisfaction” (p. 343). The 
quality of everyday life and work would be significantly improved if workers were allowed some 
measure of control over the design and production of the goods they made and were “richly 
endowed in capacity for enjoying the fruits of collective work” (p. 344). 
This was a radical call for educational and political empowerment of the masses through 
art, beginning with their own experience rather than with the so-called ‘serious’ music and art of 
14
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experts and social elites. Dewey (1934) was less prone than McMurray to making rigid 
distinctions between good and bad art, between use and enjoyment, and between art and daily 
living, rather the opposite. His goal was to re-establish “the continuity of esthetic experience 
with normal processes of living” (p. 10), and including objects in daily use and enjoyment. As 
stated in Experience and Nature,  
Capacity to offer to perception meaning in which fruition and efficacy interpenetrate is met by 
different products in various degrees of fullness; it may be missed altogether by pans and poems 
alike. The difference between the ugliness of a mechanically conceived and executed utensil and 
of a meretricious and pretentious painting is one only of content or material. (Dewey, 1929/1958, 
p. 378)  
Dewey thus did not idealize or reify fine art. “Any activity that is productive of objects whose 
perception is an immediate good, and whose operation is a continual source of enjoyable 
perception of other events exhibits fineness of art” (p. 365). But neither was he proposing a crass 
commercialism, which was also attributable to art’s segregation from ordinary life in that the 
masses were driven by their aesthetic hunger “to seek the cheap and vulgar” (Dewey, 1934, p. 6). 
He would have regarded the term serious music as pretentious and a product of “pigeon-hole 
theories of art” that exacerbated the problem of art’s segregation from the daily living of the 
masses by fostering “a ready-made compartmentalization” of music or by spiritualizing “it out of 
connection with the objects of concrete experience” (p. 11). Both tendencies only reinforced the 
misperception among the masses that art was foreign to their experience and the word aesthetic 
“a synonym for something artificial” (p. 13). He frowned upon the notion of connoisseurship, 
because it implied highly specialized training and a snobbish cult of the deliberately esoteric (p. 
238). If theory were to contribute to art’s comprehension, it would have to start with “experience 
of the common or mill run of things to discover the esthetic qualities such experience possesses” 
15
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(p. 11) and not with ecstatic eulogies of acknowledged masterworks. “Even a crude experience,” 
he famously quipped, “if authentically an experience, is more fit to give a clue to the intrinsic 
nature of aesthetic experience than is an object already set apart from any other mode of 
experience” (p. 11). Similarly, a philosophy of art, and thus also of art education, is sterile 
“unless it makes us aware of the function of art in relation to other modes of experience, and 
unless it indicates why this function is so inadequately realized, and unless it suggests the 
conditions under which the office would be successfully performed” (p. 12). 
McMurray (1956), though, in an earlier article published in The Journal of Research in 
Music Education, rejected Dewey’s instrumentalism and experimentalism, accusing him of 
“inconsistency and inadequacy as [an] educational theorist” (p. 110) and insisting that music be 
taught strictly for its own sake, as pure, unadulterated sound. Like Broudy (1958), Leonhard and 
House (1959/1972), and generations of music teachers to come, McMurray conceived of music 
appreciation “in terms of a strictly personal relation between. . . selected works and a particular 
individual” and thus missed “a sense of the way [sic] in which art exercises its humane function” 
(Dewey, 1934, p. 346). He misconstrued Dewey’s (1920/1950) definition of education as a 
growth process that “renders its subject capable of further education: more sensitive to 
conditions of growth and more able to take advantage of them” (p. 146) as suggesting that the 
role of the music teacher was simply to promote musical growth for its own sake. The pursuit of 
non-musical goals such as democratic citizenship, McMurray (1956) opined, amounted to 
educational philistinism. 
To Dewey (1920/1950), however, the educative process was “all one with the moral 
process” (p. 145). Education should prepare children as moral agents who could help to create a 
better world, which was a profoundly political purpose that implied the breaking down of the 
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barriers between school and society, art and politics (Dewey, 1929/1958, p. 363). Art education 
had moral and political purpose in that it developed imagination, which was “the chief 
instrument of the good” (Dewey, 1934, p. 348). “The first stirrings of dissatisfaction and the first 
intimations of a better future,” he wrote, “are always found in works of art” (pp. 345-346). It is 
true that Dewey was dubious about direct criticism of current conditions through art. 
Philosophers might do that directly, but artists should do so indirectly,  
by disclosure, through imaginative vision addressed to imaginative experience (not to set 
judgment) of possibilities that contrast with actual conditions. A sense of possibilities that are 
unrealized and that might be realized are when they are put in contrast with actual conditions, the 
most penetrating ‘criticism’ of the latter that can be made. (p. 346) 
These social, moral, and political functions of art, however, cannot be fully realized “as long as 
art is the beauty parlor of civilization” (p. 344).  
Dewey admittedly may have contributed to the confusion about his politics and art in 
that, as Rorty (1989) observes, there is a tension in his work between his roles as social activist 
and the “philosopher as politically neutral theoretician—a specialist in, and authority upon, such 
peculiarly philosophical topics as the rules of logic, the nature of science, or the nature of 
thought” (p. x). How We Think (Dewey, 1933/1989), often called ‘the bible’ of the progressive 
education movement, gives the impression of political neutrality with its description of reflective 
thinking as based on the scientific method. Elsewhere, though, Dewey is 
remarkably frank in commending the philosophy of education embodied in How We Think as one 
calculated to change the character of American institutions—to move society to the political left 
by moving successive generations of students to the left of their parents.” (Rorty, 1989, pp. xi-xii) 
This façade of political neutrality in that particular book may have been constructed for strategic 
political and professional reasons, but it left him open to charges of “making socialist 
17
Woodford: Dewey's Bastards
Published by OpenCommons@UConn, 2012
 18 
propaganda and disguising it as a ‘philosophical,’ and thus presumably neutral, discussion of the 
nature of thought” (p. xii). 
There may be a certain truth to this charge of propaganda, since Dewey in the 1920s and 
1930s knew that he was locked in an ideological struggle with conservatives for the hearts and 
minds of Americans, as did Mursell (1939). However, it is just as likely a reflection of the 
ambiguity in his own career as he straddled his two professional roles as social activist and sage. 
As Rorty (1989) explains, 
Dewey was, in some measure, forced to acquiesce in the role of neutral specialist. He had to 
accept, and make use of, his role as sage, even while insisting that the image of sage [as discoverer 
of objective truths] was a relic of undesirable and obsolete ways of thinking. (p. xi) 
The important thing here is that he was aware of the tensions and ambiguities between these 
professional roles and “moved insouciantly back and forth between them” (p. xi) according to his 
needs. One could make a similar point about Mursell (1958) during the last years of his career, 
that his chapter in Basic Concepts was intended to give the pretence of political neutrality. 
However, as already suggested, it was more likely an indication of the reformers’ success in 
setting the terms for education through increased professional specialization and a “more 
orthodox adherence to the principles of science and objectivity” (Faye, 2011, p. 12).  
Dewey’s “pretense of neutrality” notwithstanding, music education leaders during the 
1950s must have known of his political project because it was spelled out in Art As Experience 
(1934) as well as in many other of his books and essays throughout the first half of the century, 
including Democracy and Education (1916/1921), The Public and Its Problems (1927/1946), 
“Shall We Abolish School Frills?” (1933/1986d), “Education for a Changing Social Order” 
(1934/1986b), “The Social-Economic Situation and Education” (Dewey & Childs, 1933/1989), 
and “No Half-Way House” (1934/1986c), to name only a few. In “Education and Social Change” 
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(1937/1939), for example, the utopian belief that schools can be politically neutral is roundly 
criticized as contributing to the  
perpetuation of disorder and increase in blind because unintelligent conflict. Practically, moreover, 
the weight of such action falls upon the reactionary side. Perhaps the most effective way of re-
inforcing reaction under the name of neutrality, consists in keeping the upcoming generations 
ignorant of the conditions in which they live and the issues they have to face. This effect is more 
pronounced because it is subtle and indirect; because [as we have seen with Broudy’s model of 
connoisseurship] neither teachers nor those taught are aware of what they are doing and what is 
being done to them. (p. 696)  
It is important to understand that Dewey was not proposing that the schools actually align 
themselves with political parties. Rather, instead of diverting children’s attention from the world 
and its problems, schools should challenge them to explore the often contentious social and 
political issues of the day (Dewey & Childs, 1933/1989, pp. 46-47). This would be no easy task 
for teachers. Even in his own time Dewey (1937/1939) encountered resistance from teachers who 
complained that this politicization of curriculum was fraught with difficulty and was probably 
futile. This professional intransigence among teachers always surprised him, because it showed 
“a profound lack of faith” (p. 696) in their own potential and that of the schools to contribute to 
the improvement of social conditions, in other words, that teaching and education could really 
matter. 
To this very day, music teachers and undergraduates are still reluctant to talk about how 
music and music education relate to politics (Jorgensen, 2004). Were he alive today, Dewey 
would attribute this tendency of political avoidance to decades of indoctrination brought about 
by an institutional overemphasis on abstract thinking at the expense of critical analyses of real 
world social problems. In Art as Experience, Dewey (1934) complained about “theories which 
isolate art and its appreciation by placing them in a realm of their own” because, once 
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institutionalized and “embedded in. . . habits of life” (p. 10), people assume that art’s segregation 
from other forms of experience is inherent in, or natural to, it rather than an imposition from 
without. 
During the early Cold War, American music teachers quickly realized that if their subject 
was to have a place in the schools and universities, it had to be reconstrued as a discipline and 
that they had play by those rules. In a very short time, and with hardly any discussion or debate 
whatsoever, American music teachers enthusiastically rallied “under the banner of aesthetic 
education” (McCarthy & Goble, 2002, p. 20) with its belief that music had an objective existence 
of its own, untainted by everyday human values, and that it was therefore only natural that it 
should be segregated from politics and other forms of experience. The trouble with this model of 
education, Dewey (1934) warned, was that it politically emasculated individuals by rendering 
them uninformed and passive: 
Compartmentalization of occupations and interests brings about separation of that mode of activity 
commonly called ‘practice’ from insight, of imagination from executive doing, of significant 
purpose from work, or emotion from thought and doing. Each of these, too, has its own place in 
which it must abide. Those who write the anatomy of experience then suppose that these divisions 
inhere in the very constitution of human nature. (pp. 20-21) 
Few teachers during the early Cold War and continuing to the present realized that this 
educational emphasis on objectivity and disciplinary knowledge was a deliberate attempt by 
what today would be called neoliberals and neoconservatives to impose a level of social control 
over education and, thereby, over society. This was actually spelled out to some extent in 
Bruner’s (1960, 1962/1970) books, The Process of Knowledge and On Knowing: Essays for the 
Left Hand, although the political implications were somewhat masked by his doublespeak about 
achieving mastery over the world and its resources in the name of peace and progress. The new 
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emphases on objectivity and social control through disciplinary knowledge and expertise 
subsequently had a profound impact on curriculum development and classroom practice in 
American and other schools and universities for generations to come. 
One of the keys to achieving social control is actually identified in the latter book in a 
chapter entitled “The Control of Human Behavior,” wherein Bruner (1962/1970) proffers that it 
is not so much money that shapes behavior as it is  
the nature of the job. . . . One gets a job as a mailman and one ‘behaves mailman,’ or if one is 
hired as a professor, one behaves that way. In time one develops what the French have long called 
une deformation professionnelle, a set of habits and outlooks to match the requirements of the job. 
One also develops an expectancy of support. To assure that the behaving is ‘professor’ or 
‘mailman’ we use the coercive technique of withdrawal or reduction in support. (p. 147) 
This is similar to what postmodernists call performativity, whereby knowledge and truth claims 
are legitimated by the rules of the game or discipline in question. The trick for those wishing to 
establish social control over the teaching profession and the masses is to be in a position to set 
the rules of the game so that the desired thoughts and behaviors become self-perpetuating and, 
because endlessly repeated, assumed as natural (Lyotard, 1984/1996, pp. 491-493). 
This was what happened to Mursell and to other educators during the early Cold War, 
and again during the economic and cultural crises of the 1980s that provided the impetus for the 
standards movement. In the 1980s, consensus politics and fear mongering made it possible for 
those on the right of American politics to set the terms for all education by narrowly conceiving 
the role of the teacher as a purveyor of facts, disciplinary knowledge, and abstract skills and 
abilities. Today, as during the late 1950s and early 1960s, “the prevailing ideal” for government 
and education is “good management . . . based on confidence in the application of trained 
intelligence” (Bruner, 1962/1970, p. 164), which, because of the increasing prevalence of 
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scientific technology, “involves increasing dependence upon specialism” (p. 162). In this ‘brave 
new world,’ teachers are too isolated and busy helping students achieve mastery over 
disciplinary knowledge and abstract skills to have much time for moral judgment, community 
building, or for political dissatisfaction or protest with respect to educational and social 
inequality (p. 165). Nor, because education is conceived entirely in terms of preparation for the 
future, are students encouraged to live in and to enjoy the present (Dewey, 1920/1950, pp. 145-
146). 
 Among the important lessons that music teachers should realize from the demise of the 
progressive education movement are that policy, curriculum, and pedagogy are never politically 
neutral and that, if they are to ensure that their own programs are in the best interests of the 
masses rather than the rich and powerful, they will have to learn more about their own histories 
and how their own understandings of professional practice have always been shaped by local, 
national, and global politics and interests. As Max Kaplan (1966) observed almost half a century 
ago, music teachers have “always tended to live now and think later” (p. 8). However, if music 
teachers are to avoid Mursell’s mistake during the 1940s of failing to anticipate the use of 
schools as an instrument for social control and war rather than for peace, they must pay closer 
and critical attention to national and international politics, economics, and events. If not, they 
will continue to jump on the proverbial bandwagon of education reform without giving due 
consideration to its implications for them, their students, and society. 
Considerable soul-searching is also in order if teachers are to ensure that their programs 
and pedagogical practices work to foster good democratic, rather than corporate, citizens by 
promoting critical awareness of social inequities, such as the Occupy Wall Street movement has 
been proposing. McMurray (1991) was right that students should learn how capitalist and other 
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powerful interests often shape their tastes and understandings of music and of the world. 
American teachers should also realize that their own avoidance of political issues relating to 
socio-economic class and distribution of wealth and educational resources was shaped, at least in 
part, by conservatives during the 1950s and 1980s. “One of the intellectual victories of the 
Reagan Revolution,” Freeland (2011) reminds us, “was to make it feel practically un-American 
to talk about how the pie was divided” (p. E6). Conservatives are still playing that political card 
today to silence those calling for a more equitable re-distribution of the wealth through increased 
corporate regulation and higher taxes for the rich. 
McMurray and Mursell were both right that teachers and teachers-in-training should learn 
how the hierarchical and authoritarian structure of traditional large ensembles may work to teach 
the majority of students to accept their humble places as second or third class musical citizens. 
Mursell (1951) was also right in observing that those same ensembles—because too narrow and 
exclusive—may continue to relegate music to the periphery of the school. Teachers and 
university faculty should instead think big and work to promote critical awareness and musical 
participation involving all manner of activity and levels of ability “on the largest possible scale” 
(p. 24) and far beyond the music program, school, and university.  
 Finally, music teachers will have to become more sceptical and critical of authority and 
of their own professional organizations while demonstrating a greater willingness to engage in 
wider professional and public debate about social values and the corresponding direction of 
music education and of education in general. For to repeat Dewey’s warning, and 
notwithstanding McMurray’s (1958) advice to music teachers to keep their own counsel, 
avoidance of controversy and debate will only serve to maintain the status quo by keeping all 
concerned in ignorance of what they are doing and of what is being done to them. Mursell 
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understood the importance of this as he doggedly defended progressive education almost to the 
bitter end. Of all his publications, the one that is most inspiring, because politically charged, 
courageous, and still relevant to our own political experience today, is his 1939 article “The 
Defeat of the Schools” that boldly challenged the conservative educational view that educational 
success can only be achieved through “high pressure and rigid requirements” (para 41). The 
parallel with our own time of neoliberal globalization with its emphases on national and 
international standards, standardized testing, educational specialization and competition, and 
vocational training is obvious and requires no elaboration. It will suffice to simply restate 
Dewey’s (1933/1986a) admonition to government and teachers that “bankers and outside 
pecuniary interests” (p. 134) should never be permitted to dictate social and educational policy. 
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